

When completeness is not enough: an introduction to algebraisable logics

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joint work with Davide Quadrellaro

Algebraisable logic is a key concept from the field of Abstract Algebraic Logic (AAL) — the general study of relations between logics and algebras.

- 1 Basic notion and results from AAL
- 2 Inquisitive logics InqB and InqI
- 3 Algebraising weak logics

History

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- 1970s — H. Rasiowa presented general theory of algebraisation for implicative logic, predecessor to AAL
- 1980s — W. Blok and D. Pigozzi introduced the concept of algebraisable logic. Their work is taken to be the origin of Abstract Algebraic logic.

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- Isomorphism theorems between deductive filters and congruences.
- Equational completeness theorems and the Tarski - Lindenbaum process
- Matrix semantics and the Leibniz congruence
- Various bridge theorems
 - Example: An finitary and finitely algebrisable logic L has the Deduction-detachment property iff its equivalent algebraic semantics has equationally definable principal relative congruences.

Logic as a consequence relation

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A **logic** of type \mathcal{L} is a consequence relation \vdash on the set $\mathcal{F}m_{\mathcal{L}}$ that is closed under **uniform substitution**:

- 3 For all substitutions σ , if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\sigma[\Gamma] \vdash \sigma[\varphi]$.

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They have the same theorems, but $x \vdash_{K_g} \Box x$, but $x \not\vdash_{K_l} \Box x$.

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$$\Theta \vDash_{\mathbf{Q}} \varepsilon \approx \delta \iff \text{for all } \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{Q} \text{ and for all } h \in \text{Hom}(\mathcal{F}m, \mathcal{A}) \\ \text{if } h(x) \approx h(y) \text{ for all } x \approx y \in \Theta, \text{ then } h(\varepsilon) \approx h(\delta).$$

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The class \mathbf{Q} is an **algebraic semantics** for a logic \vdash of type \mathcal{L} if there exists a set of equations $\tau(x)$, s.t.:

$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi \iff \tau[\Gamma] \vDash_{\mathbf{Q}} \tau(\varphi).$$

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- No subclass of Modal Algebras is algebraic semantics for K_I .
- Slightly more unsettling:
By Glivenko's theorem, $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{CPC}} \varphi \iff \{\neg\neg\gamma : \gamma \in \Gamma\} \vdash_{\text{IPC}} \neg\neg\varphi$.
Then it follows that $\text{CPC} \leftrightarrow \mathbf{HA}$ via $\tau = \{\neg\neg x \approx 1\}$.

Matrix semantics

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Theorem

Every logic is complete wrt to the class of its matrix models.

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- 1 Although both $\models_{\mathbf{BA}}$ and $\models_{\mathbf{HA}}$ interpret \vdash_{CPC} :
 - only the **BA** interpretation can be reversed by a set of formulas $\Delta(t', t'')$:

$$\Delta(x, y) := \{x \rightarrow y, y \rightarrow x\}$$
$$\Delta(\Theta) \vdash_{\text{CPC}} \Delta(\varepsilon, \beta) \iff \Theta \models_{\mathbf{BA}} \varepsilon \approx \delta;$$

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- both directions are provably inverse to one another:

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- 2 Although both $\models_{\mathbf{BA}}$ and $\models_{\{2\}}$ interpret \vdash_{CPC} , only **BA** is a class of equationally definable algebras, i.e. a variety.

Quasi equations and Quasivarieties

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$$\mathbb{I}(\mathbf{Q}) := \{\mathcal{A} : \mathcal{A} \cong \mathcal{B} \text{ for some } \mathcal{B} \in \mathbf{Q}\}$$

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Theorem (Maltsev)

A class of algebras \mathbf{Q} is a quasivariety if and only if it can be axiomatized by a set of quasi-equations.

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We then call \mathbf{Q} **the equivalent algebraic semantics** for \vdash .

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Theorem (Uniqueness of Equivalent Semantics)

If $(\mathbf{Q}_1, \tau_1, \Delta_1)$ and $(\mathbf{Q}_2, \tau_2, \Delta_2)$ witness the algebraisability of logic \vdash , then:

$$(1) \mathbf{Q}_1 = \mathbf{Q}_2 \quad (2) \tau_1(x) \vDash_{K_I} \tau_2(x) \quad (3) \Delta_1(x, y) \Vdash \Delta_2(x, y).$$

Note: Proof of (3) relies on substitution invariance.

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- for the formulas of InqI, we drop the classical disjunction $\varphi \vee \varphi$.

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As a result, both InqB and InqI are not closed under uniform substitution.

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We shall extend AAL to take account for logics with weaker forms of substitution.

Let $\text{Subst} := \text{Hom}(\mathcal{F}m, \mathcal{F}m)$ and let AT be the set of substitutions σ s.t. $\sigma[\text{AT}] \subseteq \text{AT}$.

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Given a class of substitutions $\text{AT} \subseteq C \subseteq \text{Subst}$, a **C-logic** is a consequence relation \vdash , s.t.

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Core of a Weak logic

We define the set of **admissible substitutions** AS of a C -logic \vdash as:

$$AS(\vdash) = \{\sigma \in \text{Subst} : \forall \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \subseteq Fm \Gamma \vdash \varphi \implies \sigma[\Gamma] \vdash \sigma(\varphi)\}.$$

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We say that \mathcal{A} is **equationally definable** if there is some equation $\varepsilon(x) \approx \delta(x)$ such that $\text{core}(\mathcal{A}) = \{x \in \mathcal{A} : \varepsilon(x) \approx \delta(x)\}$.

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If \mathbf{Q} is a class of expanded algebras and $\Theta \cup \{\varepsilon \approx \delta\}$ a set of equations, we define:

$$\Theta \vDash_{\mathbf{Q}}^c \varepsilon \approx \delta \iff \text{for all } \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{Q}, \\ \text{for all } h \in \text{Hom}(\mathcal{Fm}, \mathcal{A}), \text{ s.t. } h[\text{AT}] \subseteq \text{core}(\mathcal{A}) \\ \text{if } h(\varepsilon_i) = h(\delta_i) \text{ for all } \varepsilon_i \approx \delta_i \in \Theta, \text{ then } h(\varepsilon) = h(\delta).$$

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Proposition

The core validity of a quasi-equation $\bigwedge_{i \leq n} \varepsilon_i \approx \delta_i \rightarrow \varepsilon \approx \delta$ is preserved by $\mathbb{I}, \mathbb{S}, \mathbb{P}, \mathbb{P}_U$ and \mathbb{C} .

Algebraizability of Weak Logics

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$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi \iff \tau[\Gamma] \vDash_{\mathbf{Q}}^c \tau(\varphi) \quad (\text{Alg1})$$

$$\Delta[\Theta] \vdash \Delta(\eta, \delta) \iff \Theta \vDash_{\mathbf{Q}}^c \eta \approx \delta \quad (\text{Alg2})$$

$$\varphi \dashv\vdash \Delta[\tau(\varphi)] \quad (\text{Alg3})$$

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$$\eta \approx \delta \dashv\vdash_{\mathbf{Q}}^c \tau[\Delta(\eta, \delta)]. \quad (\text{Alg4})$$

We then say that \mathbf{Q} is the **equivalent algebraic semantics** of \vdash .

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Theorem (Maltsev Theorem for Core-Generated Quasivarieties)

Let \mathbf{Q} be a quasi-variety of expanded algebras, then:

$$\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{Q}_{CG} \iff \mathcal{A} \models^c Th^c(\mathbf{Q}).$$

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The following Uniqueness Theorem then follows:

Theorem (Uniqueness of Equivalent Semantics)

If $(\mathbf{Q}_1, \tau_1, \Delta_1, \varepsilon_1 \approx \delta_1)$ and $(\mathbf{Q}_2, \tau_2, \Delta_2, \varepsilon_2 \approx \delta_2)$ witness the algebraisability of a weak logic \vdash , then:

$$(1) \mathbf{Q}_1 = \mathbf{Q}_2$$

$$(2) \tau_1(x) \models_{\mathbf{Q}_i} \tau_2(x)$$

$$(3) \Delta_1(x, y) \dashv\vdash \Delta_2(x, y)$$

$$(4) \varepsilon_0 \approx \delta_0 \dashv\vdash_i \varepsilon_1 \approx \delta_1$$

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InqB *is algebraisable*.

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We let:

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Our result follows from the fact that ML is generated by regular elements, together with the fact that InqB is complete with respect to $\text{Var}(\text{ML})$. \square

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Assume that InqI is algebraisable by some $(\mathbf{Q}, \tau, \delta, \varepsilon \approx \beta)$.

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Recall that split axiom holds for \forall -formulas.

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(Rough) proof idea

Assume that InqI is algebraisable by some $(\mathbf{Q}, \tau, \delta, \varepsilon \approx \beta)$.

Recall that split axiom holds for \forall -formulas.

Then for any $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{Q}$, $\text{core}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \{\text{join-irreducible elements of } \mathbf{A}\}$.

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The contradiction stems from the fact that join-irreducible elements are not equationally definable. □

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If \vdash is algebraizable with equivalent algebraic semantics $(\mathbf{Q}, \tau, \Delta, \varepsilon \approx \delta)$, then for all $\sigma \in \text{Subst}$:

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Theorem

Let \vdash be algebraizable with equivalent algebraic semantics $(\mathbf{Q}, \tau, \Delta, \varepsilon \approx \delta)$, then we have $\text{Schm}(\vdash) = \text{Log}_{\Delta}^{\tau}(\mathbf{Q})$.

Duality Between Filters and Congruences for Weak Logics

Let \vdash be a C -logic and \mathcal{A} an expanded algebra, a set $F \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ is a **deductive filter** if:

$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi \implies \forall h \in \text{Hom}(Fm, \mathcal{A}), h[\text{AT}] \subseteq \text{core}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ and } h[\Gamma] \subseteq f \text{ entails } h(\varphi) \in F.$$

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Theorem

Let \vdash be a weak logic with equivalent algebraic semantics \mathbf{Q} , then:

$$Fi_{\vdash}(\mathcal{A}) \cong \text{Cong}_{\mathbf{Q}}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ for all } \mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{Q}.$$

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What we should do next:

- Extension of our setting to non-algebraisable weak logics, e.g InqI .
- Applications to other logics without uniform substitution.

Thank you for your attention!



Nick Bezhanishvili, Gianluca Grilletti, and Wesley H. Holliday. “Algebraic and Topological Semantics for Inquisitive Logic Via Choice-Free Duality”. In: *Logic, Language, Information, and Computation. WoLLIC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 11541*. Ed. by Rosalie Iemhoff, Michael Moortgat, and Ruy de Queiroz. Springer, 2019, pp. 35–52.



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